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Introduction
The 20th century has been marked by a widespread movement towards gender equality.
Though this has led to better opportunities for women, especially in industrialised countries, a sometimes shocking picture can be seen in a few developing countries where equality is still a faraway goal. The mortality rate for girls and women, for example, is much higher in South Asia and China in comparison to their male counterparts (Sen, 1989; Klasen, 1994) . Especially in developing countries, education differs dramatically between genders, and pay gaps also exist (ILO, 2003a) . To exemplify the gender-based wage gap, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 1995) mentions Bangladesh, where female workers in the non-agricultural sector only earn 42 % of the wages of their male counterparts.
Apart from the sometimes severe human suffering of individual females that are subject to discrimination, the economic consequences for the country affected can be substantial. To begin with, gender bias may reduce economic growth rates. This link has been well established in the literature by Drèze and Sen (1989) , Pritchett and Summers (1996) , and Klasen (2002) . Above all, gender discrimination may discourage workers from entering a job to which they are best suited, thereby lowering the value of output. Also, a gender bias in education implies that females will be less well educated and, hence, less skilled.
Lower human capital levels, in turn, are likely to affect GDP growth rates negatively.
Moreover, inequality in access to resources and in particular in education may inhibit reductions in child mortality and fertility rates and prevents the expansion in education of the next generation. These important development policy goals are closely linked to the educational attainment levels of the female population (Summers, 1994; Murthi, Guio and Drèze, 1995) . To the extent that these linkages exist, gender bias in education may thus prevent progress in the improvement in well-being of the people in a considerable number of developing countries.
Furthermore, there is also concern that gender inequality may affect the (cost) competitiveness of countries by lowering (female) wages, thereby influencing trade flows.
Along these lines, gender inequality has been debated within a wider range of topics related to basic labour standards, which also include child and forced labour as well as union rights. In particular, fears have been stated that there might be a "race to the bottom" on such standards (OECD, 2000) . Rich countries like those of the European Union and the United States have insisted on the inclusion of binding rules within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to ensure a level playing field and to deal effectively with fundamental workers' rights. Developing countries, on the other hand, fear that highincome countries are likely to excuse protectionist trade measures against foreign competition by accusing their low-cost competitors of abusing labour standards.
How could a gender bias influence trade flows? In a standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, using capital and labour as the main production factors, the impact depends on changes in relative factor endowments. If two (developing) countries both have a relatively large workforce, then an enlargement in the supply of labour by, for instance, an increase in the female labour force in only one country would lead to an improvement in its comparative advantage in labour intensive products. Note that standard international trade theory does not address wage inequalities, since it assumes that these do not exist in highly competitive markets, at least in the long run. According to Becker (1971) , gender wage gaps may occur if employers have, for instance, a preference for discrimination (based on socio-cultural habits) and are able and willing to afford it, as the firm will be worse off. In an open economy, trade would lead to increased competition, making it much more costly for employers to discriminate. As a consequence, gender wage gaps which cannot be explained by differences in educational attainment are likely to be reduced.
Yet we do observe gender inequality in wage remuneration not only in closed, but also in more open economies, which raises some concern about the fundamental assumptions in neoclassical trade models and places emphasis on the importance of exploring the linkages between gender inequality and international trade. Oostendorp (2004) , for example, finds that increased trade narrows the wage gap for unskilled labour in both developing and developed countries, but this does not apply to skilled labour. Focusing on the United States, the results reported by Black and Brainerd (2004) support the prediction that increased competition from trade benefits females by reducing employers' power to discriminate.
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On the other hand, the results reported by Seguino (1997 Seguino ( , 2000b , who analyses the link between gender wage inequality and export (and growth) performance in a number of semi-industrialised, export-oriented countries, show that gender imbalances may have contributed to the export success of several countries. Also, Berik et al. (2004) examine the trade performance of (South) Korea and Taiwan (China), two highly open economies, and find that competition from trade in competitive industries is positively associated with wage discrimination against females in these two countries. In a further study, Osterreich (2002) demonstrates that gender wage gaps are negatively related to the terms of trade for manufactured goods in semi-industrialised countries, that is, more discrimination leads to lower export prices and a worsening of the terms of trade.
Regarding the female labour supply, Busse (2002) shows that trade flows and the female activity rate might be associated to some extent, but he focused his analysis more on basic labour standards. Similarly, other studies analysed the impact of increasing globalisation on female employment (Wood, 1991; Standing, 1989 Standing, , 1999 Kucera and Milberg, 2000) .
In general, an enlargement in trade might increase the number of jobs available for females and/or fosters the concentration of females in export-oriented industries.
Conversely, Joekes (1995) notes that the percentage of (unskilled) females in the labour force might peak at a certain level and then fall again over time, as the export structure of the economy moves up to skilled products where (skilled) males outweigh females. Also, there is some anecdotal evidence of international connections between gender inequality and trade. Rodrik (2000) reported that Mauritius set out on a development strategy that depended on operating an export-processing zone. The segmentation of the labour force along gender lines, with female workers predominately employed in the export-processing zone, was crucial, as it ensured a large additional pool of low-wage 1 See also the literature surveys by Cagatay and Ertürk (2004) and UNCTAD (2004). workers with fewer rights for export production. Male workers, in contrast, have been able to preserve their status in the remaining sectors of the economy. In another example, Bhattacharya and Rahman (1999) observed that women in Bangladesh are likely to be pushed into low-skilled/low-wage jobs in the ready-made garments industry, which might explain Bangladesh's export success in this sector. Summing up, the evidence available in the literature has been rather limited and inconclusive. In particular, an extensive empirical analysis of the linkages between trade in those labour-intensive products, where women in developing countries are likely to work, and gender inequality seems to be missing.
Against this background, the paper deals with three issues: (1) how to measure gender inequality; (2) whether gender inequality is closely associated with the structure of trade flows, that is, comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactured goods (crosssectional analysis); and (3) whether that relationship holds over time in a panel data analysis. Accordingly, the paper is structured as follows: The next section shows how gender inequality can be defined and measured, whereas Section 3 briefly explains the (empirical) model and data used. The results of the empirical analysis of the linkage between gender inequality and comparative advantage in labour-intensive products are presented in Section 4. Finally, some policy implications and concluding remarks are found in Section 5.
Measuring Gender Inequality
There have been several attempts to measure female inequality across countries. In 1995, the UNDP (1995) introduced two indicators to quantify the degree of gender inequality:
The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). The GDI is based on three variables, namely life expectancy at birth, educational attainment, which is measured by literacy rate and school enrolment, and access to resources in terms of GDP per capita converted at purchasing power parity exchange rates. These variables are also used to calculate the Human Development Index (HDI); however, the GDI adjusts the values for gender equality.
2 The GEM combines income shares, professional opportunities and participation in economic decision-making 3 and parliamentary participation as shares of parliamentary seats for both males and females.
Common for both indicators is that they combine absolute values for the considered indicators with a penalty for inequality. 4 Bardhan and Klasen (1999) , Oudhof (2001) and Dijkstra (2002) criticise the composition of both UNDP indices. In particular, they all worry about an over-weighted income variable, as the GDI is strongly correlated with the absolute level of income. GDI and GEM, therefore, may underestimate gender inequality in richer countries. Dijkstra (2002) argues that these indicators do not just measure inequality, since they combine absolute achievement levels with a valuation of inequality.
While various modifications have been suggested to overcome the shortages of the GDI and the GEM, 5 most of them cannot solve the problem with the income variable.
Against this background, we do not use these standard indicators as measures of gender inequality in the following analysis, but rather rely on disaggregated measures for gender imbalances in the labour market and education. More specifically, we measure gender inequality in three dimensions:
(1) Inequality in wage remuneration, computed as 1 minus the female divided by the male wage rate in manufacturing times 100 (the variable is called Wage-inequality) (2) Access to the labour market, quantified by relative female/male labour market activity rates for individuals, ages 15-64 (Lab-inequality) (3) Access to education, quantified by relative female/male literacy rates and relative female/male gross secondary school enrolment, both weighted 1/2 (Edu-inequality)
The first indicator is usually known as the gender wage gap. Note that a higher figure for In contrast to the gender wage gap and differences in access to education, inequality in labour market participation rates does not necessarily involve gender discrimination, as females may choose not to work or to work fewer hours if they take care of children or other family members. Discrimination in access to jobs, in job promotion or wages, on the other hand, may lead to a reduction in the female labour supply, thereby signalling discrimination too. As we cannot determine whether differences in labour market 6 Data sources for these and all other variables are reported in Appendix A. 7 Oostendorp (2004) provides an extensive description of the ILO October Inquiry database. 8 See Appendix B for the country sample. We have refrained from incorporating gender wage data from other sources, since we do not know whether they are compatible with the ILO data. Employment-related welfare systems and job security should be equally accessible for both male and female workers.
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To see whether the ratification of both ILO conventions is related to our three indicators, we have computed a further variable, called Convention, representing the number of ratified core ILO conventions on discrimination (the indicator takes the value zero, one or two). Interestingly, ratifying the two ILO conventions seems to be a poor measure for the extent of gender inequality, as the correlations with Wage-inequality, Lab-inequality and Edu-inequality are rather low (Table 1 ). In 2000, the highest partial correlation is -0.26, implying that countries with a smaller gender wage gap are more likely to ratify the two 9 Of course, the ILO not only focuses on gender discrimination, but also on discrimination based on skin colour, religion, political beliefs or social origin. conventions on gender discrimination. 11 Since the linkage between ratification and enforcement is rather low, we do not use Convention in our empirical analysis. Further, richer countries have on average less gender inequality in wage remuneration, labourforce participation rates and, in particular, access to education. 
Trade Effects of Gender Inequality and Trade Indicators
After the introduction of the different measures of the extent of gender inequality, we focus next on the empirical model and the data used in the analysis. As an appropriate theoretical framework to analyse the linkages of trade flows and gender inequality, we use a standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, assuming two countries, two goods (one labourand one capital-intensive) and two production factors (capital and labour). If we have identical production technologies, constant returns to scale, identical and homogeneous consumer preferences across countries and no market distortions, then a country is likely to have a comparative advantage in the labour-intensive good if it is relatively labour abundant and capital scarce.
Within this modelling framework, an increase in the female labour-force participation rate, that is, a decline in gender inequality, enhances the labour endowment and expands or changes production possibilities with a bias towards labour-intensive goods. 12 As the production of these goods increases relative to the other goods, the country improves (or gains in) its comparative advantage. By modelling gender inequality in this way, we do not consider any effect on welfare levels, since these depend on a number of assumptions that are not the main focus of this paper. In particular, gender inequality itself is not incorporated in the utility function. Such an approach is far beyond our methodology, and therefore excluded from the analysis. Finally, the impact of gender inequality in wages is more difficult to incorporate into this modelling framework. In a Heckscher-Ohlin setting, relative factor prices across countries (wages and capital rents) are equalised through the equalisation of relative commodity prices (factor-price-equalisation theorem). This also applies to wages, as there are no differences in the remuneration of females or males within a country (assuming no productivity differences). Moreover, relative wages are the outcome of relative commodity prices, not the other way around. Any existing gender wage gap would be inefficient and costly to employers (Becker, 1971) . Nevertheless, we do observe that male workers may enjoy higher wages, which cannot be explained through differences in labour productivity. Assuming persistent gender inequality in wages would then enable a firm to gain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis firms in other countries (and competitors in its own country). As a consequence, we would observe a stronger comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods.
In general, gender inequality is unlikely to affect significantly the overall export performance of a country, but rather the trade structure, that is, the composition of exports, may be changed. 13 Importantly, there is considerable evidence that females dominate certain export industries that are relatively labour intensive, such as textiles and clothing (Table 2) . Usually, these are sectors that employ a larger number of labourers and provide relatively low wages (Seguino, 2000b ). Yet it is unclear whether females in developing and emerging market economies are working in these sectors due to a lack of other job opportunities or by choice. Nevertheless, the employment patterns do indicate considerable job segregation. Similar to textiles and clothing, other manufactured sectors that have a considerable share of females are footwear, sporting goods, toys, or electronics (UNCTAD, 2004) . In certain countries, job opportunities for females may have been restricted to these specific exportoriented sectors of the economy. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to labour-intensive manufactures, since the impact of gender inequality will be felt most strongly in these sectors.
The relative labour intensity of manufactured goods is above all influenced by value added per worker.
14 Table 3 shows all commodities and the corresponding SITC numbers for labour-intensive commodities. Importantly, to check for the robustness of the results we use two different categories: core labour-intensive goods, which consist of textiles, apparel, glass products, footwear, or toys, and a broader range of these products, which comprises all goods included in the core category plus labour-intensive electronics, such as TVs, radios, telephone receivers, toasters, etc. Tyers et al. (1987) and own assembly.
We also differentiate between two different trade indicators to measure comparative advantage in these commodities: First, Trade-exp1 and Trade-exp2 are computed as the ratio of labour-intensive exports to total exports for the core and broader range of labourintensive goods, respectively; and, second, Trade-rca1 and Trade-rca2 stand for revealed comparative advantage in these goods. Trade-rca1, for example, is calculated as follows:
13 Though Seguino (1997 , 2000a found that a gender bias had an impact on the trade performance of Taiwan and South Korea, it is unclear whether her results can be generalised for all developing countries. Specific circumstances in these two countries may have contributed to their export success. 14 The data on labour-intensive commodities has been taken from Tyers et al. (1987 As comparative advantage in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework is influenced by relative factor endowments, two control variables are used in the benchmark regression:
• Capital, which stands for the relative capital endowment, computed by average total investment in the previous ten years, that is, the annual average of the period 1991 to 2000 for the capital stock in 2000, divided by the land area • Labour, measured as the total labour force in proportion to the land area, for the relative labour endowment
The first control variable is expected to be negatively associated with comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods, whereas the second is likely to be positively correlated with the four trade indicators. All countries reporting data for the dependent and independent variables have been included in the data set. The exception is Singapore, which has an extremely high labour density as a city-state.
The cross-sectional analysis is based on data for the year 2000. The specification of the basic trade model is as follows:
(2) Trade = α 0 + α 1 Capital + α 2 Labour + α 3 Regional dummies + α 4 Control indicator for gender inequality + α 5 Indicator for gender inequality + e where Trade stands for the four trade indicators, e is an error term and α i are parameters.
Apart from adding indicators for gender inequality, we also control for the equivalent aggregated indicators. If we focus on gender inequality in access to education, for instance, we also control for total educational attainment for both males and females.
Moreover, a set of regional dummies in all cross-sectional regressions is included, to allow for regional characteristics.
Empirical Results
We start the presentation of the results of the linkage between trade flows and gender inequality with those for the gender wage gap. As can be seen from the results for the first four regressions, presented in columns 1 to 4 of Table 4 , Capital and Labour have the expected negative and positive signs and are statistically significant at the 1 and 5 per cent level. The overall fit of the first two regressions is reasonable for such a heterogeneous set of countries, but considerably higher for Trade-rca1 and Trade-rca2.
Whereas total wages in manufacturing (Wage)
15 as a further control variable has the expected negative sign, it does not seem to be closely associated with the trade indicators.
Yet the gender wage gap always has a positive coefficient and a statistical significance at the 5 per cent level. The sign of the parameter implies that a higher degree of gender inequality in wages is positively associated with an improved comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods. But we have to keep in mind that the country sample is restricted to 29 countries, since only for these countries were total wage and gender wage data able to be obtained for the year 2000. White's (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity; multicollinearity has been tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass at conventional levels; to save space, the coefficients for the regional dummies are not shown; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Next, we examine the same linkage in a panel, employing data for 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 . In general, panel (or pooled time-series) analysis can be performed either by using a common intercept for all countries, the country-fixed effect or the country-random model. While suitable F-tests suggested not using a common intercept for all countries, Hausman (1978) Tradeexp2
Traderca1
Traderca2
Tradeexp1
Tradeexp2
Traderca2 Four countries that did not report trade data for the year 2000 had to be excluded from the crosssectional, but not from the panel data analysis; see Table 4 for further notes.
The results might have been influenced by the inclusion of high-income countries, which usually have a relatively low share of labour-intensive exports in total exports (and no or very little comparative advantage in these goods). For that reason, sign and significance of the coefficients of the gender inequality indicators might be biased. To further examine the robustness of the results, high-income countries have been excluded in a second set of regressions. Only low-and middle-income countries, namely countries with a GNI per capita in 2000 of 9,206 US dollars or less according to a definition by the World Bank (2004), were incorporated in the regressions. Along these lines, the focus is on relatively poor countries, where gender inequality might be a problem of higher importance in comparison to higher-income countries. In total, 70 developing countries have been singled out, using the World Bank definition for our country sample.
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As can be seen from Table 6 , the results in the cross-sectional analysis do hold up. The sign of the coefficients are identical, though the statistical significance is somewhat weaker in comparison to the regressions for the full country sample. On the other hand, the linkage does not hold over time, as Lab-inequality still is positive but not significant in the panel analysis. Overall, the extent of gender inequality is positively associated with comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods, though the relationship is stronger if all countries are included in the sample. Tradeexp2
Traderca2 variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Finally, the relationship between female/male differences in access to education and trade in labour-intensive products is examined. We add Education to the regressions, 19 Again, due to data deficiencies, four developing countries had to be excluded from the cross-sectional analysis, but representing total literacy rates and total gross secondary school enrolment, both weighted 50 per cent, to control for total educational attainment. The results for all countries in the cross-sectional analysis, reported in columns 1 to 4 of Tradeexp2
Traderca1 not from the pooled times-series analysis. 20 Importantly, these results do not change much if the income threshold is set at a lower level, for instance, US $2,975 per capita, representing the income level for low-and lower-middle-income countries. Tradeexp2
Traderca2 variables
(1) Summing up the empirical evidence, our results show that there is a positive linkage between comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods and gender wage inequality and a negative link with respect to gender inequality in labour market participation rates and access to education. While the links between trade and gender inequality in labour-market participation rates and educational attainment are somewhat weaker, depending on whether all countries or just developing countries are included or whether a particular trade indicator for comparative advantage has been used, the clearest link (in terms of statistical significance) can be established regarding the gender wage gap, as firms may exploit wage discrimination to gain or enhance a comparative advantage in labourintensive products.
Overall, these results are in line with those of Seguino (1997 , who showed that wage differentials can boost total exports in export-oriented semi-industrialised countries.
On the other hand, we carefully differentiate between total exports and the export structure. If a country has a very strong (and maybe increasing) comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods, that does not automatically imply higher GNI growth rates, as the country might be locked to the production of these commodities and might not be able to switch to higher-valued goods over time. If that is the case, we do not expect a significant impact on growth rates. There might even be a negative influence if prices for labourintensive products fall over time as competition increases.
Against this background, our results do not contradict the empirical evidence on the negative link between economic growth and gender inequality reported by Drèze and Sen (1989) , Pritchett and Summers (1996) , and Klasen (2002) . What our results do indicate, however, is that developing countries with less gender wage inequality might be negatively affected, as their comparative advantage in labour-intensive commodities may erode if other countries with a similar factor endowment rely on females in their export sector. Also, the results imply that industrialised countries do not have a problem with gender inequality in developing countries; they may even "profit" from its occurrence due to possibly lower prices for labour-intensive goods.
Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
As there is some cause for concern regarding the linkage between gender inequality and comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods, the question might arise as to whether sanctions -on an international level -should be imposed on commodities from countries with poor fundamental labour standards, such as high gender inequality in wage remuneration. Supporters of this position, who usually come from high-income OECD countries, argue for connecting trade and labour standards, if possible within the WTO framework, thereby punishing developing countries that do not observe basic standards and/or giving them an incentive to raise those standards, that is, to reduce gender inequality.
Though sanctions are popular, the effectiveness of trade sanctions as an instrument is highly questionable. In a large number of cases, countries do not change their behaviour because sanctions have been imposed on them (Hufbauer and Elliot, 1999) . What is more, this instrument focuses only on export industries and does not tackle gender bias in other areas. Trade sanctions may drive females to other sectors with potentially even lower labour standards. Regarding child labour, a closely related core labour standard, there is evidence that the effects of sanctions were unsatisfactory in some developing countries. In Bangladesh, for example, children were thrown out of their jobs in the garment industry as a result of boycott pressures by the United States, with most children ending up in far more dangerous employment, such as welding and prostitution (UNICEF, 1997).
Finally, the inclusion of labour standards in the WTO framework may even be exploited by high-income countries to protect their markets against allegedly "unfair" imports from poorer countries with lower standards. 21 That is exactly what developing countries fear, as Bank (2004) 
